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Is	the	European	Parliament	missing	an	opportunity	to
reform	after	Brexit?
While	Brexit	negotiations	are	beginning	to	progress,	the
European	Parliament	is	preparing	to	vote	on	the	possible
reallocation	of	seats	following	the	UK’s	departure.	With	many
of	the	current	proposals	reflecting	Member	States’	concerns
about	losing	seats,	Robert	Kalcik,	Nicolas	Moes	and
Guntram	B	Woolf	(Bruegel)	advocate	for	options	that	could
better	achieve	equality	of	representation	even	within	the
constraints	of	the	EU	treaties.
On	18	January	2018,	the	European	Parliament	(EP)	will	vote	on	its	new	distribution	of	MEPs	per	Member	State	after
Brexit.	In	the	UK	73	MEPs	are	elected,	and	these	seats	can	either	be	dropped	or	reallocated	across	countries	or
even	in	a	transnational	list.
In	an	earlier	paper,	we	calculated	the	implications	of	various	reallocation	options	for	measures	of	the
representativeness	of	the	European	Parliament.	We	showed	that	while	the	European	Parliament	is	highly	unequal	in
its	representation	of	EU	citizens,	significant	improvements	can	be	achieved	while	remaining	within	the	constraints	set
by	the	EU	treaties.
Guy	Verhofstadt	sits	at	the	European	Parliament,	December	2017.	Photo:	©	European	Union
2017	–	European	Parliament	via	a	CC-BY-NC-ND	4.0	licence
In	this	post,	we	present	the	political	choices	that	the	EP	is	currently	negotiating	and	show	what	they	mean	for	equality
of	representation.	We	conclude	with	our	own	proposals.
The	proposal	currently	negotiated	within	the	Parliament’s	Committee	on	Constitutional	Affairs	(AFCO)	aims	to	fulfil
three	objectives:
1.	 No	smaller	state	is	given	more	seats	than	a	bigger	state	and	no	smaller	state	has	a	higher	ratio	of	population
per	seat	than	a	bigger	state.	This	is	necessary	and	sufficient	to	satisfy	degressive	proportionality,	a	requirement
from	the	European	treaties.
2.	 No	loss	of	seat	by	Member	State,	a	political	wish.
3.	 Minimum	reallocation	of	the	vacant	British	seats,	in	order	to	cut	the	costs	of	the	European	Parliament	(a
political	wish	–	even	though	the	numbers	do	not	add	up	to	much).
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While	degressive	proportionality	was	satisfied	for	the	2009	elections,	the	reallocation	of	seats	decided	for	the	2014
elections	did	not	respect	that	principle	anymore,	focusing	instead	on	limiting	each	Member	State’s	loss	of	seats.
Given	the	different	growth	rates	of	national	populations	over	the	past	four	years,	the	situation	has	worsened	and
more	states	do	not	respect	degressive	proportionality.
AFCO	has	seven	amended	versions	of	the	new	seat-allocation	proposals	currently	under	discussion.	The
implications	of	all	proposals	across	countries	are	presented	in	the	table	here.	But	what	are	the	implications	of	the
proposals	for	equality	of	representation?	We	present	two	measures	regularly	used	by	political	scientists;	the	voting
Gini	coefficient	and	the	index	of	malapportionment.	The	former	measures	the	degree	to	which	representation	differs
from	equal	representation,	i.e.	one	man	one	vote.	Malapportionment	measures	the	percentage	of	seats	that	must	be
reallocated	in	order	to	achieve	equality	of	representation.
In	all	the	proposals	made	by	members	of	the	committee,	the	new	composition	of	the	EP	ends	up	more	electorally
unequal	than	the	pre-Brexit	situation,	by	both	measures	(cf.	the	table	here)!	For	example,	the	base	AFCO	proposal	is
3.0%	and	4.8%	more	unequal	than	the	current	situation	when	measured	by	malapportionment	and	voting	Gini
respectively.	While	it	is	designed	to	satisfy	degressive	proportionality	as	mentioned	above,	it	actually	results	in	more
inequality	than	simply	withdrawing	the	73	British	seats	from	the	Parliament	(also	proposed).	When	comparing	the
different	proposals	among	themselves,	we	see	that	the	one	by	Guy	Verhofstadt	(proposal	in	Amendment	141)
performs	the	best	by	far	in	terms	of	electoral	equality.
While	all	these	versions	ensure	that	no	Member	State	loses	any	seat,	there	is	a	lot	to	gain	from	more	courageous
proposals.	Kalcik	&	Wolff	(2017)	have	shown	that	without	any	Treaty	change,	the	EP	could	achieve	inequality
scores	much	lower	than	the	current	situation.	After	updating	their	widget	with	new	population	data,	we	likewise	find
that	the	Parliament	could	be	up	to	26.8%	less	unequal	when	allocating	seats	in	order	to	minimise	malapportionment.
When	allocating	seats	to	minimise	the	voting	Gini,	we	can	find	an	allocation	19.7%	less	unequal.	Both	allocations
respect	the	constraints	of	the	EU	treaties	and	are	based	on	a	Cambridge	Compromise	formula,	widely	accepted	by
experts	as	a	basis	for	allocation	proposals.	The	resulting	compositions	are	detailed	in	the	columns	“Minimising	Voting
Gini”	and	“Minimising	Malapport”	in	our	table.
This	would	however	require	several	Member	States	to	lose	more	than	1	seat,	a	politically	difficult	bargain.	Still,	when
limiting	each	Member	State’s	loss	to	1	seat	maximum	and	a	total	size	of	700	seats	–	as	in	the	base	AFCO	proposal	–
the	EP’s	malapportionment	can	shrink	by	13.7%	and	its	voting	Gini	coefficient	by	8.3%	without	any	change	to	the	EU
treaties.	This	approach	also	improves	on	the	current	situation	by	correcting	some	of	the	existing	divergences	from
degressive	proportionality.	The	resulting	composition	is	detailed	in	the	column	“Limited	Loss”	in	the	table.
Other	compositions	are	of	course	possible,	each	more	or	less	politically	feasible	and	performing	differently	against
inequality	measures	and	other	criteria.	The	updated	widget	is	available	on	the	Bruegel	website	so	that	readers	can
compare	and	compute	other	proposals.	It	also	enables	exploration	of	proposals	that	would	require	change	in	the
European	treaties,	as	might	be	the	case	for	the	2024	elections,	and	also	allows	users	to	design	a	transnational	list.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
Bruegel.
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policy.
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and	monetary	policy	and	global	finance.
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